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SELFISHNESS AS AN ETHICAL THEORY.
BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.
It is one thing to say that as matter of fact all men
seek their own pleasure or happiness, and quite an-
other thing to say that they should do so. The former
statement belongs to the realm of psychology ; the
latter proposes an ethical rule. In a previous article
(June 4), I questioned the correctness of the psycho-
logical statement and I now propose to inquire as to
the tenability of the ethical rule sometimes derived
therefrom.
At the outset, it strikes one as strange to propose
as a rule what everyone is said to do of his own ac-
cord. A rule should be something to guide us, but if
we always do, and cannot help doing, what the rule
enjoins, the rule becomes, to say the least, super-
fluous. If we can no more help acting selfishly than
we can help breathing, there is about as much sense
in urging us to act selfishly as in putting the injunction
upon us to breathe.
A "should" naturally suggests the possibility of
acting otherwise ; but if in the nature of the case we
cannot act otherwise than we should act, the "should"
is practically meaningless. There is little sense even
in asking us to eschew self denial and unselfishness,
if on account of our psychological constitution self-
denial and unselfishness are impossible, and every act
is necessarily interested and for our own advantage.
And the fact that advocates of selfishness do warn us
against unselfishness and sfelf-denial looks like a giving
away of their case—since it is hardly rational to warn
men against what they can as little do as they can
escape from their own shadow or jump over the moon.
Suppose some one should say that a straight line is
the line which no one can help drawing in connecting
two points. There would be nothing in such a state-
ment to guide us when we were seeking to draw a
straight line ; it would be the same as saying. Go
ahead and draw in whatever way you like, a rule is
quite unnecessary. The fact is, if all men act selfishly
and must of necessity do so, ethics in general (and
not merely any specific rule) is a superfluity ; and the
very words, "should," "ought," "obligation," "duty"
would have to pass into disuse and be regarded as
survivals of an antiquated mode of thinking.
Such moral scepticism or nihilism is also forced
upon us by another consideration. If selfishness is the
true ethical rule, i. e. if the pursuit of our personal
pleasure or happiness is the right aim, it follows that
any way in which we find happiness is right. If one
person makes himself happy by doing good in the
world, very well ; but if another finds that cruelty
gives him pleasure, we must also say, very well. If
this man finds it to his advantage to speak the truth
and keep his word, he acts rightly in doing so ; if the
other gets ahead by lying and breaking faith, he acts
also rightly., A recent defender of selfishness * (and
one who has the rare merit of being straightforward
and fearless in his logic) goes to the length of saying
that //it made him happy to get drunk, to treat his
wife as his slave and to beat his children, he should
undoubtedly do those things—and he asks, why then
should he condemn those who actually live that way
for no other reason than that he in fact finds his hap-
piness in doing differently ? If then everything is right
which gives one pleasure or happiness and the most
contradictory things do give pleasure or happiness, it
follows that moral distinctions break down and that
love and hate, truth and lying, temperance and drunk-
enness, marital faithfulness and adultery, stand on
the same moral plane. Such is the conclusion drawn
by the writer I have quoted. He says :
" One act is just as virtuous as another ; one man is just as
righteous as another. The man who picks my pockets is just as
good a man, morally speaking, as he who at the risk of his life
pulls me out of the river. The murderer is just as righteous as
the philanthropist, the ravisher as innocent as his victim, a drunk-
ard as moral as an ideal clergyman. Each of these only does what
he must, will and should under the circumstances."
And with remarkable consistency he adds :
'
' Men muddle their brains with such words as right and wrong,
morality, duty and virtue ; they say I ought to do this or not to do
that . . . . ; but there are no such things or powers or obligations
as these " In fact. " there is no morality but what vain people
have manufactured."
By no means does it follow that one must be a bad
man to say such things ; I believe that this writer is
personally not only one of the most straightforward
and fearless, but one of the most just, unselfish and
tender hearted of men. But I suppose that whatever
he is he regards as his idiosyncracy ; and if b}' acci-
dent he were mean and cruel instead, I suppose that
* Hugh O. Pente T-weiitietli Century. ArnI 2.
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he would deny (as a matter of logic) that there was
any obligation for him to try to act differently.
Such seems to be the logical outcome of selfishness
as an ethical theory. Practically in an individual case,
it may work no harm ; but in general, if men could
sophisticate themselves so far as to adopt it and act
upon it, the result would be grave moral deterioration.
There are only two ways in which the result might be
avoided ; first, if all men had good instincts and dis-
positions to start with (which is manifestly untrue),
and second, if there were a kind of pre-ordained con-
stitution for every one, in virtue of which, whatever
expectations men cherished in connection with wrong-
doing, the actual and necessary result were misery and
unhappiness. The latter proposition may possibly be
true ; for one, I confess I should like to believe it. It
would be a most powerful argument in favor of a moral
order and constitution of the world, if it could be
made out that however we may wish to be happy,
there are only certain ways in which we can be happy,
it would look as if nature itself was on the side of
those "certain ways," and gradually discovered them
to us in the course of our experience and manifold
experimentation.
And yet as a matter of fact there are grave difficul-
ties in the way. It is, of course, true that to one of
sympathetic disposition the reflection that he has some-
time been harsh and inconsiderate brings pain. A
naturally just-minded man undoubtedly finds humilia-
tion in recollection of any incident in which his in-
terests betrayed him into unjust treatment of another.
Dryden has finely said :
'* The secret pleasure of a generous act
Is the great mind's great bribe."
But can it be truthfully said that every one feels a
pang in remembrance of unsympathetic conduct ? If
we do unjust things does it necessarily follow that we
experience humiliation afterward ? Is the cut and
make of our nature so that we cannot do mean things
without subsequent revulsion of feeling—and to us all
does the secret pleasure of a generous act come like a
great bribe ? As I have said, I should like to believe
so ; but the fact seems to be that human nature is
variable, and what gives pain to one person does not
to another. It is sometimes by our thoughts, our
speculative reason and not by convincing experiences
of pleasure or pain that we learn what is right. What
a noble saying is that of Sir Philip Sidney's !— " Doing
good is the only certainly happy action of a man's
life." But I am afraid the truth is simply that doing
good is the only certainly happy action of a good xnvcCs
life. Does giving make a miser happy? It seems to
cost as much discomfort and pain for some men to
part with a dollar as for a child to cut a tooth.
" Society is no coinfoi t
says Shakespeare. Sometimes we are not happy in
doing good to ourselves any more than in doing good
to others. As the same great observer and critic of
human life has written :
" Your affections are
A sick man's appetite, who desires most that
which would increase his evil."
As men are, personal comfort and happiness make
a poor guide for them. It is safe to have supreme
regard for such a standard, only when we are already
perfectly moralised and rationalised—that is, when
reason and conscience have such a dominancy in us
that we can have no happiness save in following their
dictates. And even then, when as Wordsworth says,
joy has become "its own security," joy would not
really be the guide, but the effect of following the true
guide, which is ever to be found in the rational nature
of man. As most men are, it is actually dangerous to
follow after what each thinks will make him happy
and that only ; it is because they do this so unthink-
ingly that they fall into the pitfalls that they do.
George Eliot had given up all theological views of
morality, and yet she once wrote, " There are so many
things wrong and difficult in the world that no man
can be great—he can hardl)' keep himself from wicked-
ness—imless he gives up thinking much about pleas-
ure and rewards, and gets strength to endure what is
painful." What better illustration could we have of
the truth of this, than in Mr. Pentecosts own words :
" Don't kill the Czar unless to do so would surely make
you happier, but if it would make you happier, then
kill him," and, again, "Don't destroy property or
throw stones at scabs, unless you are sure it would
make you happier to do so, but if you are sure, then
do it." There is, of course, no deed of shame, no
wild act of blood, no monstrous tyranny that could not
be justified for the perpetrator of it by the same logic
—the Czar himself and all persecutors, monopolists,
seducers of the innocent, grinders of the poor, de-
vourers of widows' houses, being thus made blameless.
It is not in place for me at present to attempt to
say what the true guide is : my object is purely criti-
cal. But I may briefly remark in general that guid-
ance, in my view, lies in our thoughts rather than our
desires for pleasure and happiness. We can find pleas-
ure in all sorts of things, but we cannot think all sorts
of things to be right. Our thoughts are ahead of our
impulses ; there are certain things we are bound to
call right by virtue of our very nature as rational
beings and to the extent men have followed reason,
they have done so. It is in these progressive and en-
larging thoughts that I find the clue to nature's pur-
pose with regard to us, to the Divine plan of our being.
]Vc cannot help thinking certain things to lie right ; we
may not do them, we may not want to do them, our
wishes may go clean contrary to them, and yet, if we are
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honest with ourselves, we cannot help thinking them
to be right. The practical problem of life is to make
our thoughts, and not our haphazard cravings for
pleasure, rule. Here is the field of moral conflict, the
occasion for the exercise of the moral will.
" And oh, when Nature sinks, as oft she may,
Tluough loPK-Iived pressure of obscure distress.
Still to be strenuous tor the bright reward,
Still in the soul to admit of no decay.
Brook no continuance of weakmiiidedness —
Great is the glory, for the strife is hard ! "
XB. Thefollo-tving three articles are criticisms of Mr. Salter's
first article "Sclfshness: a Psychological Argument," which ap-
peareJ in No. jgy of The Open Court.— Ed.
PLEASURE IN SELFISHNESS AND ALTRUISM.
BY J. C. F. GRUMBINE.
It was with more than ordinary interest that I read
William M. Salter's recent contribution entitled "Self-
ishness : A Psychological Argument," to The Open
Court—particularly because his treatment of the sub-
ject seemed to me to be most ingenuously devised.
His criticism of the position held by Leslie Stephen,
Lester Ward, Bain and Bentham will not, I think,
hold good. He seems to think that to a.ct for a thing
such as happiness as an end is to act with it constantly
in mind, as if not to do so were a possibility. He
then instances the youthful player at ball who is de-
sirous of beating all his contestants in the game, (the
victory which he expects to receive will afford him the
most agreeable sensation which is called happiness)
but who as he warms up in the game forgets all about
the real end which he has in view, viz. the pleasure
to be derived from beating or from becoming the vic-
tor in the game. Mr. Salter thinks that if the end is
the happiness to be received by winning the game,
then he would have it always in mind. How does
Mr. Salter know that he does not have this very pleas-
ure in mind, and if so, what difference does it make,
if as Mr. Salter thinks, he plays having in mind the
chief or relative steps to the end in view could he get
victory or the result of victory—which to him is so
much pleasure—without leading his conduct on the
field toward the attainment of the end which he is
conceded to have in view. To change the figure, can
a man who desires to be happy by using his talent
rightly along the line of art, medicine, law, or mer-
cantile business, ever expect to obtain happiness in
the particular way he has chosen, by not having in
mind the means to the end—whatever they may be ?
And is it not a play on words to say that because one does
not always have in mind (how can he think two differ-
ent thoughts at the -same time any more than he can
occupy at the same time two places) correlatively and
simultaneously both the means to as well as the end
for which he acts, he is not acting for happiness. The
psychological analysis of Mr. Salter seems, therefore,
to me to be untenable in this instance. Then, again,
he alleges that the motive of hunger, if I may be per-
mitted to call it such, or the satisfying of appetite is
not the pleasure which results from the act of eating,
but it is the desire for an object such as food that
prompts one to eat. This may be true as far as it
goes, but this appears to me to be the fact or the real
status of the case, that whereas an excessively hungry
man would eat simply " to fill up," a man in a normal
condition as well as a starving man would eat as much
for the pleasure which would result in the general
process of living from his keeping his physical organ-
ism, by eating proper food, in a sound and healthful
state ; or in addition to the pleasure which one is af-
forded by eating that which he likes, there is the ulti-
mate pleasure which is derived from eating the proper
food judiciously. This after all is the chief considera-
tion.
Mr. Salter neglected to touch upon the pleasure
which is not so much a result of choice as it is the re-
sult of action prompted by constitution and mechan-
ism. An egotistic person acts, it is said, from the
motive of self-interest while the altruistic person acts
from the motive of self-love or benevolence. Egotism
pleases but does not benefit a man, while altruism
pleases and benefits him. Nay more than this, whilu
egotism curses the egotist, altruism blesses not only
the altruist, but humanity. In order to get the best
and most permanent happiness one should seek for
and use the means which will produce it. To say that
one cannot seek and obtain his highest happiness ra-
tionally and resolutely is to say that we are in the
world to obtain our highest good by being a blind
leader of the blind.
SELFISHNESS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.
BV A. H. HEINEMANN.
EuDEJiONis.M makes the feelings of pleasure and
pain the foundation of its edifice of moral science say-
ing, that a state of pleasure, or a diminution of pain,
constitutes, in every case, the sole motive of action.
An attempt to disprove this principle was made by
Mr. W. M. Salter in No. 197 of The Open Court. Had
he limited himself to a discussion of the propriety of
the qualification "sole" given to "motive," he might
have had a better chance of success. The pivotal
point of the discussion, however, is the definition of
the word "pleasure." Pleasurable feelings are so
different as to render any attempt at a definition of
general acceptability extremely difficult. The only
definition ever offered satisfactory to my mind, is that
proposed by Dr. P. Carus in his " Soul of Man," say-
ing, that "pleasure is the feeling that naturally ac-
companies the gratification of wants " (p. 343).
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In order to make this definition serviceable, it will
be necessary to agree upon the meaning of the word
"want." A want is a feeling of deficiency. Hunger,
for example, is a feeling of a deficiency of nourish-
ment, or a want of food ; cold is a feeling of a defi-
ciency of heat, or a want of warmth. Thus is love a
feeling of a deficiency of society, or of the complete-
ness of being, or a want of intercourse with another
being. The sense of dut)' in an emergency shows a
deficiency of right action, or a feeling of a want lo act
in obedience to conscience.
Let us see how the definition fits the cases adduced
by Mr. Salter in No. 197 of Tlie Open Court. He says
of hunger that i' it is not the pleasure of satisfying
hunger the really hungry man is thinking of, but the
food— it seems a direct appetite for an object." Hun-
ger is a feeling of some shortage, or emptiness to be
filled ; a painful deficiency to be replenished ; replen-
ishing, or filling being the natural remedy for the want.
This remedy is found in eating which, by diminishing
the pain, grows pleasurable, in agreement with the
eudemonistic principle.
If Mrs. Browning says: "If heads that hold a
rhythmic thought must ache perforce, then I, for one,
choose headaches," she clothes a eudemonistic ex-
perience in the paradoxical form of a desire for pain.
She does not truly choose headaches—not fool enough
for it. But not being able to secure the pleasure of
rhythmic thought without the accompaniment of a
painful headache, she submits to the latter rather than
forego the pleasure of the former. It is a clear eude-
monistic transaction.
J. St. Mill's assertion that men will "pursue sen-
sual indulgences (i. e. pleasures) to the injury of
health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater
good," is an uncommonly strong confirmation of the
eudemonistic law. The man indulging, is moved by
a present pleasure so powerfully as to disregard an
unmistakable warning of pain to follow in the future.
Present pleasure overpowering a hope of remote pleas-
ure, is a well known eudemonistic experience.
J. St. Mill considering the condition of a discon-
tented Socrates preferable to that of a contented pig,
pronounces every kind of philosophical thought so
great a pleasure as to render the condition of a Socrates
even when discontented or seemingly unhappy, more
desirable than that of a hog whether such hog should
walk on four legs or on two. Mill intends to gauge
the pleasure of Socrates and that of the hog in order
to vindicate the eudemonistic principle.
Enoch Arden desirous of possessing his wife again,
feels it to be his greatest duty to provide for her hap-
piness. He feels he would be tormented with pains
were he to disturb her happy, cmdition. But her hap-
piness depends upon his resigning his claims on her.
His renunciation seems the only means to secure her
liappiness and thereby his own greatest gratification.
Or, Enoch Arden's self-denial is a corroboration of
eudemonism.
Every one of the examples recited in No. 197 of
The Open Court can be treated like the above examples
in order to show the application of eudemonism to
every kind of human action. The above discussions,
however, suffice to demonstrate that in every effective
motive of action a feeling of pleasure or pain is found.
Any such feeling may be called an interest, or, there
is no effective motive unless the agent is interested in
it. Anything indifferent can never, in a healthy being,
be a want to be gratified, or an anticipation of pleas-
ure, or an object to be desired or willed. Being in-
terested in an object, means, being inclined fo give
attention to it, or to- concentrate our activities upon
it, or to will it. Thus, an interest, or a pleasurable
emotion, says the law, is necessary to transform a con-
.
ception into an effective motive of action.
The law of pleasure and pain is founded in our
nature, says modern evolutionary thought, that is to
say, it is a natural law acting with necessity. It says
that every living creature, in a condition of health,
strives to obtain pleasure and to obviate pain, or, it is
these subconscious feelings of pleasure or pain, which
prompt every action performed within animated na-
ture. The muscular reactions observed in the lowest,
or simplest living beings, are what is commonly called
reflex motions. A reflex motion is a muscular reaction
responding to a subconscious feeling. The reaction
shows whether the feeling was either agreeable or dis-
agreeable, i. e. pleasurable or painable.
Similar motions are observable in higher animals.
A bull excited by pain will fly into a fury and hurry
along carelessly, almost unconsciously, a proceeding
hardly distinguished from reflex motion. All activity
of living creatures continues of this kind until reflec-
tive thought has grown to be a power strong enough
to act as a check upon reflex motions caused by feel-
ings of pleasure or pain. Such checks may be noticed,
for example, in a lion who having failed to reach his
prey by making his leap too short, proceeds to undergo
a special course of training in the art of jumping, by
measuring the distance and practising until he has
found out and learned to put forth the exact amount
of exertion requisite to give to his leap the length
wanted. Such rational proceedings can no longer be
called reflex motions ; they are distinctly conscious
activity regulated b)' reflection and by a determination
not easy to distinguish from what is called "will" in
man. There is a motive in the leonine activity which
can no longer be identified with a subconscious feeling
of pain or pleasure, but which is the result of that
mental activity called reflection. Such motives may
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be called intellectual motives to distinguish them from
sensitive motives as found in the subconscious feel-
ings of pleasure or pain.
When the stage of mental reflection is reached in
the animal kingdom, the immediate effect of a feeling
of pleasure or pain, is checked or modified. The re-
flective mind begins to distinguish between its own
feelings and external objects. From that stage on-
ward the action of the natural law of pleasure and pain
is complicated' by the interference of intellectual mo-
tives, that is, of conceptions not immediately identi-
fiable with feelings of pleasure or pain.
Reflex activity forms the greater amount even of
the doings of the human race. Men whose senses act
with sufficient energy, will perform the common acts
of daily life, that is not merely those of their animal
existence but also those of their business occupations
according to the natural rule of pleasure and pain.
They are used to attend to their daily business in
a machine like manner. The various activities of
business life are the effects of settled habits of thought,
that is to sa)', the mind has formed a series of con-
ceptions each of which corresponds to an act of busi-
ness to be performed. At any given moment of the
day, one of these business conceptions is uppermost
in the mind, forming the centre of interest, the sensi-
tive motive that wants to be acted out. This want
has to be gratified by the performance of whatever
activity' the conception may suggest. Little reflection
is needed. Attention to what is going on is all that
is required. The performance is pleasurable because
it is in conformity with habit, or agreeable to the na-
ture of the individual. An infraction of daily habits is
liable to cause pain. Or, in other words, the habitual
activity of the daily life of men, like that of animals,
is regulated by the natural law of pleasure and pain.
So far the eudemonistic principle reigns supreme
in man as in animals. There is no conflict until in-
tellectual motives begin to interfere with sensitive
motives. Such an interference occurs in those excep-
tional cases which require the activity of critical re-
flection. But even then the conflict is apparent only,
that is it ends in harmonious interaction between the
natural and the moral law.
The psychic processes called reflection are subject
to natural law as are the workings of the principle of
pleasure and pain. It is according to natural law that
w.e reflect and reach decisions as to which conceptions
of our minds must be selected to be the strongest mo-
tives. That decision or selection determines what we
ought to do. But between the "ought" and the real
deed there is still a gap to be filled.
The filling out of this gap is the business of voli-
tion, and it is to this act only that the moral law ap-
plies.
The ought is determined by reflection pointing out
the conception which is worthy to move the will. But
the will may, or may not, make it a motive of ac-
tion, or a guide in voluntary activity. By coming to
a decision and assigning to an idea the position of a
ruler of action, the agent makes it the centre of his
interests, that is, the object of his supreme desire.
He thus transforms it into an incitement of pleasur-
able feelings and thereby enlists the natural power of
pleasurable sentiment in the carrying out of his de-
sign. In this way the harmony between the natural
and the moral laws is established.
Pleasure and pain being subjective feelings, fail to
determine anything concerning the nature of the mo-
tives of action. It is the particular province of the
moral law of free will, by deciding which idea is to be
the motive of action, to determine the nature of the
objects to be pursued by moral activity.
In every voluntary action, therefore, there are
these two laws found co operating : the moral law de-
termining the subject-matter, and the law of pleasure
and pain ruling the natural working, that is, the steady
supply of force in the pursuit of moral action.
Summing up ; the eudemonistic law of pleasure
and pain finds universal application in tlie natural ac-
tivities of life ; but it has only a secondary bearing
upon voluntary action. The moral law, which is the
law of liberty or of free will, applies to voluntary ac-
tion only, that is, to those exceptional cases of human
action in which the compulsory rules of natural law
acting with necessity, are of secondary account.
The principles of necessity and of morality are con-
tradictories. Eudemonism, which is a law of neces-
sity, may offer a good basis for a science of the natural
evolution of morals. But when the stage of morality
is reached in the ascending course, eudemonism must
no longer be continued in the part of guide but must
be assigned the subordinate part of handmaid supply-
ing material force to the rule of liberty which consti-
tutes the basis of the science of pure ethics.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELFISHNESS AND META-
PHYSICAL ETHICS.
BY VOLTAIRINE DE CLEYRE,
In No. 197 of The Open Court appeared a criticism
of the egoistic conception of life from the pen of Mr.
Salter in which I was deeply interested. Interested
because I believe that as one of the leaders of the
ethical movement Mr. Salter is aware that there is no
more frequent or more fatal error to overcome, in his
work, than this very philosophy of selfishness, and
therefore should be one of those best conversant with
the proofs of its shallowness and falsity.
It is plain that the increasing interest in the ethical
problem is evidence of the unrest which sits upon
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Humanity in the presence of the destruction of its
temple. Science has torn the veil from the tabernacle
of Fear ; Man has looked within, and the space he
imagined filled with terrible ghosts is seen to be empty.
Only the darkness kept him from knowing it : now
there is light—light everywhere, and he no longer ac-
cepts the moral code "obey." Yet knowing this, in
the face of the death of God, he finds himself only at
the statement of the problem. The symbols and the
forms of religion, the vestments of priests, have be-
come only mockeries, signs of the crude worship of a
half savage imagination. And still, bound up in them,
was a something that was true ; something of which
he dares not let go, something that had served to
guide his actions, and give meaning to life. This was
the ethical problem ; to undress the truth and leave it
nude, white, shining, a luminous point moving before
Man into the infinite—the future : to explain what
good it was, that, wrapped in the dogmas of the
Church, nevertheless bound men together and served
to lift the race slowly upward.
It is at this questioning point that radical free-
thought has too often made its mistake. It falls into
one of two errors ; and the most grievous, I believe,
is this of making self the centre and circumference of
all consideration. The most brilliant of American ora-
tors, the idol of freethought, has been so mistaken,
and all his writings are permeated with the ' ' happiness
philosophy." Grieved and disgusted with a world
which "for love of Love has slain love" he has con-
ceived that the way to improve matters is to cease
urging the necessity of goodness, and insist that peo-
ple shall be happy (his conclusion being that a happy
man /s a good man). The same teaching, variously,
expressed by the most trenchant pens, is to be found
throughout the radical press. It says, practicall}' :
"the universe is purposeless; man's actions are ac-
countable to no one. Therefore let him be happy.
Let him study to discover what line of conduct will
increase the sum of his agreeable sensations, and fol-
low it. The desire for such increase is the motive to
all action, whether of the barbarian or the civilised
man ; the only difference being that the civilised man
has wider knowledge and a greater number of emo-
tions."
It was the fundamental error of this reasoning
which I had hoped Mr. Salter would have pointed out.
Unfortunately he falls into the other mistake, the sub-
stance of his article being comprised in the old, meta-
physical formula: "Do right because it is right."
People "desire certain things or objects, and while
the getting of them gives us pleasure, it is not so much
the pleasure, as the things we want." This is an ex-
planation which .does not explain. He is right in say-
ing that "the getting of them gives us pleasure";
pleasure is the result of action not its cause. But to
substitute for the assertion "I save a man's life be-
cause it gives me pleasure," "I save his life because
I want him to have his life " is to get no farther on.
It does not explain why I want a thing which is of no
particular benefit to myself. And it is the why of the
want that prompted the action. It serves no purpose
to tell people to do right because it is right, unless
they have a means of ascertaining what is right, and
why it is right. Unless the ethical movement can
answer this question, it has furnished no enduring
structure to replace the old, it has not revealed the
truth of the old. Science, which has shattered idols,
must explain religion. - Nor is this so difficult when
once we have understood ourselves. Realising that
we are parts of the universe subject to the same pro-
cesses manifest in all other forms of life, realising that
our egos are but social growths that develop accord-
ing to inheritance and environment, as do all other
growths, we are prepared to realise that our actions
are prompted by the unconscious Me, the Man which
has been accummulating, so to speak, for ages, the
social Soul which is the common inheritance of all.
This large Me which lies below our conscious selves,
is the result of all the untold struggles of Man to come
in harmony with his environment ; and the same strug-
gle goes on in us, will go on in the future. Our
pleasure is an insignificant quantity having nothing
whatever to do with the question. Indeed it is pain,
not pleasure, which unbars the gate of Progress, since
all progress comes through a quickened consciousness
that we are no longer in harmony with our environ-
ment, an awakening to the fact that the social ideal
has moved forward and we must follow it. To illus-
trate : chattel slavery was right so long as the ideals
of men had not advanced beyond it ; the yoke rested
easily upon the body of the slave and the soul of the
master. Both were happy. Why not have remained
so ? " Servants obey your masters " was to do right
because it was right. Why not have continued ? Be-
cause with the development of the vast economies of
modern production, the chattel slave system no longer
held its old relations in society : the unconscious Me
clamored for adjustment. The social ideal of larger
liberty had extended to the black men. In the end
armies killed each other. For pleasure ? Hardly.
For duty? Yes. To accomplish their ideal of right.
It is very shallow to retort, "that is the result of the
duty superstition
;
people kill each other." As well
blame those who first conceived the possibility of com-
munication between two villages for building turn-
pikes instead of at once jumping to steel rails and
locomotives.
The rightness of an action is measured by its har-
mony with the ideal which Science points out as the
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path of the social march. Upon this foundation the
ethical movement may rest, knowing the truth of the
old creeds, that they bound men together and de-
veloped the social character, repressing the instincts
of selfishness, instead of scattering, disintegrating and
belittling men, which is the inevitable result of the
Egoistic philosophy—the gospel of Caprice.
CURRENT TOPICS.
In former days, whenever the Queen of England gave a fancy
dress ball at Buckingham Palace, the Lord High Chamberlain
would proclaim the royal will and pleasure in these terms, "Her
majesty has given orders that no foreign goods be worn on this
occasion, and that the guests appear in costumes of British manu-
facture." The guests paid no attention to it, because they knew
that it was only a political appeal to the insular prejudices of the
English workingmen, and an ostentatious attempt to feed seven
million toilers with five loaves and two small fishes, without the
spiritual grace to work the miracle. The old formula, useless now
in England, has been imported into this country, for I see a proc-
lamation just issued by the "Lord High Chamberlain" of the
White House, to the effect that, "Mrs. Harrison has given orders
that no foreign goods shall be used in refurnishing and decorating
the rooms of the White House cxcift where it is impossible to
procure the nfcessary material in America." The exception is
delightful for its womanly candor, A masculine politician would
have left it out ; but Mrs. Harrison frankly and sensibly says that
she will patronise American industry if it can supply her with the
exact article she wants ; otherwise she will buy it in England or
India, in Africa or France. The exception though honest was
imprudent, for the very people flattered by the command will veto
the exception. They will issue a counter-proclamation and say
there is no necessary material impossible to procure in America,
to furnish the Executive Mansion. And these are the people who
pay for the furniture. The embargo reminds me of those ardent
patrons of American industry, who when starting on their Euro-
pean tour implore their neighbors to buy only American goods
while they themselves are going to lay in their own supplies in
England, France, and Germany.
I take some pleasure in watching the expansion and develop-
ment of the " Law of Limit and Overflow," on which I claim a
copyright, and which I claim to be that law not written in books,
which limits the rich man's power to consume, and which causes a
portion of his wealth by his own voluntary action to overflow upon
the poor. A very interesting illustration of this law I find in a
German Jew, Baron Hirsch by name, a man with millions of dol-
lars who lives in a fairy castle across the sea. I confess that he
seems to me like a fabulous person, one of these mythical barons
who lived a thousand years ago, and who have come down to us
embalmed in the legends of the Rhine. So far as I can find out,
he owns the mountains of Lebanon, and the mines of Ophir; also
the valley of diamonds discovered by Sinbad the sailor. In spite
of my doubts I am assured that he is real, and not a baron of ro-
mance, as many popular barons are. Dazzled by the splendor of
the baron's wealth, an American editor wrote him a letter and
asked him what he was going to do with his money. Instead of
taking offense at this impertinence, and ordering the editor to be
flung from the battlements of the castle, the baron politely an-
swered the letter and his answer is printed in the Xorlh Ainerimii
Rc-i'icw. In that letter I behold the statesmanship of charity, that
productive plan of benevolence which helps the poor fo help ihcm
selves, the comprehensive almsgiving of ploughs, and hammers.
and spades, with a bit of land whereon to work and live. The
baron's words are better than mine ; he says :
"What I desire to accomplish, what, after many failures, has come to be
the object of my life, and that for which I am ready to stake my wealth and
my intellectual powers, is to give to a portion of my companions in faith the
possibility of finding a new existence, primarily as farmers .and also as handi-
craftsmen, where the laws and religious tolerance permit them to carry on
the struggle for existence."
There is beautiful pathos in this heroic ambition of Baron
Hirsch to lead his afflicted "companions in faith" out of the
Land of Egypt, and out of the House of bondage. He desires to
transplant the Jewish victims of religious persecution from Russia
and other benighted nations to some free and hospitable country
where they may live in honorable industry as tillers of the soil.
He proposes to establish them not in cities but on farms. I feel a
twinge of conscience when he says that there is no room for them
in the United States, because I think he means to say there is not
any welcome for them here. This was the new Canaan of his hope
;
for he says, "In considering the plan I naturally thought of the
United States, where the liberal constitution is a guarantee of
happy development for the followers of all religious faiths." Yet
he passed us by, and will carry out his plans in the Argentine re-
public, in Canada, and Australia. I fear it was only genteel cour-
tesy that made him give as a reason for his action, " the enormous
number of Jews already in the United States ; " and that adding
to the number, " would be of advantage neither to the country it-
self nor to the exiled Jews." It is more likely that he has heard
the mutterings of that inferior public opinion which threatens to
send them back under the operation of those "pauper" laws,
"contract labor" laws, and other narrow-minded statutes which
promise after a time to strike both hospitality and magnanimity
from our national character. While we are striving to make this
country wise and great, we should endeavor to make it correspond-
ingly generous and humane ; lest there be fixed upon us the char-
acter given to Lord Bacon, and the American republic become
celebrated as the "greatest, wisest, and meanest " of all nations.
A new industry is coming into existence, the importation of
water from the river Jordan, warranted to give a superior quality
of baptismal regeneration to the children of the rich. Soon ue
shall see this advertisement in the drug stores, ' ' Water from Carls-
bad, best for rheumatism ; also some from Jordan, best for bap-
tism." As there is no competing river Jordan in the United States,
there will not be any protective tariff on the water from the ancient
stream. A sudden impulse has been given to the new business by
the recent christening of a royal baby, the grandchild of the Prince
of Wales. In describing this important event the court circular
is careful to inform an anxious world that, " The christening water
was brought from the river Jordan by Lord Rowton who recently
returned from the Holy Land." This ought to confer special grace
upon the royal infant, but the charm is weakened a little by the
astonishing fact that the Prince of Wales himself was baptised in
water from the Jordan, but in his case it didn't take. There was a
hope lingering in this democratic world that the sacraments at least
would remain of equal quality, and that fashion would not stimu-
late pride instead of humility, by providing a superior sacramental
article exclusively for the rich ; but our trust was vain. The
church must make its ordinances luxurious and exclusive, there-
fore booths for the sale of water from the Jordan must be built in
Vanity Fair. The Eucharist will become aristocratic also ; and
the royal and the rich will not partake of Holy Communion until
they know that the bread is made from wheat gleaned in the fields
of Boaz, and that the wine is pressed from the grapes of Naboth's
vineyard.
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It is told, no doubt falsely, of a famous American orator, who
was a colonel in the army, that on coming into the presence of the
enemy he promptly surrendered his command, shouting, "Hold
on there ! Don't fire ! I'm willing to recognise your condemned
confederacy ! Let's compromise ! " I see in this fable the con-
tending sects shaken by the vibrations of the printing press, sur-
rendering to each other's doctrines, and shouting " Let us com-
promise." The theological colonels, however, who so amiably
surrender are very likely to be tried for heresy, the ecclesiastical
name for desertion. At the present moment an eminent Christian
minister and a popular Jewish Rabbi are under charges, the one
for surrendering the Trinity, and the other for surrendering the
Unity of God. Even the Jews as a church are dividing like the
rest of us, although they may remain united as a race. It appears
that the Rabbi, Dr. Aaron Wise, published in the Amciicaii Ihiirew
a discourse on " Prophetism and Prophets," in which he said that
the doctrine of the trinity was a Jewish dogma older than the pa-
triarchs, and that Jesus merely revived it. This concession was
immediately condemned by the Board of Orthodox Ministers, who
passed a resolution that Dr. Wise be tried for heresy. This de-
cree was for the time suspended in order that Dr. Wise might
make an explanation, which he did, saying that his language had
been misconstrued owing to a mistranslation from the original
German, and that nothing could be farther from his mind than to
question that fundamental principle of Judaism " the belief in the
absolute unity of God." This ought to save him, and it probably
will ; but it was a close call. M. M. Trumbull.
DR. E. G. HIRSCH ON THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
The Reform Advocate has published Dr. Emil G. Hirsch's ad-
dress to the graduates of the Cook County Normal School, deliv-
ered at the commencement exercises. Dr. Hirsch lays his finger
on the sore spot of our educational system and advocates reform.
He does not want to abolish the public school system because it is
faulty. On the contrary, he wants to preserve it; for it is "great"
and " founded on granite," but he desires us to recognise its faults
and to improve the system. Though public prints and papers are
filled with the praises of our educational system, he declares, few
there are that really, not merely professedly, understand what the
teacher should be to the community. Teaching must be a life-work
and therefore the teacher should hold a life-position, that leads up
to an honorable old age devoid of the annoying sense of insecurity.
At present, the teacher's position is in this country as yet too inse-
cure, because it is too often affected by politics. The teacher must
first and above all be a psychologist. Latin and Greek alone do
not fit us to be teachers. The insufficiency of cramming and
memorising has been acknowledged and manual training has been
introduced to complement the old one-sidedness. But manual
training must be more than showing some tricks at the bench or
the anvil. We must not pour into the head from without, but de-
velop from within whatever is in the child. The pupil must be
left to act and to react upon the impulses given him. A Thousand
failures self wrought by the pupil are educationally considered of
greater and more promising worth than is one lesson perfectly re-
cited after drill and mechanical repetition. With these aims the
young teachers should go out, as it were, as "missionaries into
darkest Africa." Dr. Hirsch closed with the following words :
"Of Moses in the old legends it is said that from his light the
others lit their tapers ; his own did not diminish in brightness or
brilliancy for communicating of its flame. So will your own lamp
shine on all the more brilliantly for imparting to the young the
spark of knowledge and the ambition to learn. This is your re-
ward, a recompense which your profession has above all other.
May then come to you that satisfaction in your work which the
world cannot give but also cannot take away ! "
BOOK REVIEWS.
Intimations of Eternal Life. By Caroiine C. Lcighlon. Boston ;
Lee & Shepard.
The author of this little book after twenty years separation
from schools, churches and libraries was much impressed with
the spirit of doubt that had crept in among sacred things. Hoping
that she might be able to point out a beacon light, she attempted
to let the religious feelings draw new strength from the revelations
of science. The booklet is mainly engaged with the question :
" What is the bearing of the discoveries of the last half century on
the probabilities of our future ? " The answer is very cheerful.
There is no scientific proof, yet there are sufficient bints in nature,
which promise a universal immortality. The book is one of the
very best of its kind. It is written in a similar spirit to Drum-
mond's works. Yet we must confess that we look upon this method
of applying science to buttress the crumbling religious faith as
fantastical and—futile. It will dazzle for a while some people who
either believe or wish to believe. But it will soon be found out
that the immortality taught by science is not that of the individual
ego soul. The riiost characteristic chapter of the theoretical basis
of the author's faith is that on the psychic body, which is found to
consist of the luminiferous ether.
NOTES.
The charge of heretical' teaching brought against Prof. Max
Miiller's Gifford Lectures as was reported in a previous number,
has been thrown out of the Glasgow Presbytery by 17 to 5 votes.
It was then carried before the General Assembly and dismissed.
Prof. Max Miiller will therefore continue his lectures at Glasgow.
Two volumes of these lectures have appeard.
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